Chris Goed @ChGoed

"Top officials in the State Department made clear that only candidates who voted for President Donald Trump would be eligible for the mid-to-upper level foreign service roles. They also told candidates that their campaign donation history would be examined and any donation to Democrats would be disqualifying."

Eric Katz @EricM_Katz

3 days ago

SCOOP: The State Dept has started asking career diplomats up for promotion if they voted for Trump in 16, 20, 24. Federal law prohibits politically based hiring for career staff. State tells @washingtonsun it's screening for "fidelity" and execution of the president's vision👇

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From what I hear its improved considerably, but still not stable at higher speeds. More time needed to see if system functionality becomes consistent above the limit.

Michael Kofman @KofmanMichael

3 days ago

However, folks need more time to see if it is working consistently at higher speeds.

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A major achievement of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2026 has been stabilizing the frontline, creating the conditions for localized counterattacks while inflicting relatively high rates of attrition on Russian forces. This has been enabled by a more flexible defensive posture under the new commander-in-chief. Unmanned warfare, including mid-range strike systems, has played an important role in all of this, helping degrade Russian combat power. Recent restrictions have reduced the effectiveness of a core element of Ukraine’s defense system. Unless this is resolved quickly, Ukraine risks losing hard-won gains from 2026, not to mention the impact on its cities and critical infrastructure.

breathing is enough to give you away each breath slightly changes how Wi-Fi waves reflect off your chest. with the right receiver and processing, those tiny changes can reveal your breathing rhythm the graphs in this animation use real WiRe-Breath recordings: orange is the rhythm extracted from Wi-Fi, gray is a reference breathing sensor i broke down how this works, and what else you can pull out of the radio waves around you, in the article below ↓

ard @ardchain

2 weeks ago

x.com/i/article/2108…

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"During Operation Vivaldi, units of the 3rd Army Corps successfully used armored vehicles twice to conduct mechanized assaults behind Russian lines... According to Biletskyi, armored vehicles can no longer serve as a conventional reserve rapidly deployed after an enemy breakthrough. 'Today, the use of armored vehicles is effectively a special operation. It requires extremely detailed planning and the coordination of a huge number of assets,' he explained... The first mechanized assault helped Ukrainian forces partially encircle the settlement of Nove. During the second assault, Ukrainian armored vehicles advanced about 4.5 km behind Russian lines and deployed infantry in the rear of Russian units. The Ukrainian troops then attacked wooded areas where Russian drone operators were stationed. According to Biletskyi, losing these positions deprived Russian forces of some reconnaissance capabilities and FPV drones, allowing Ukrainian units to keep advancing. The deployed Ukrainian infantry operated virtually surrounded for several days while continuing to destroy Russian drone operators’ positions. Biletskyi said he believes the raid contributed to the subsequent collapse of a significant section of Russian defenses." militarnyi.com/en/news/ukrain…

Norwegische Soldaten bemerkten während einer aktuellen Militärübung, dass chinesische Mietwagen von Hertz (darunter Modelle der Marke Deepal) Aufzeichnungen von Soldaten, Bewegungen und sogar Sicherheitscodes für militärische Tore und Türen speicherten. nettavisen.no/nyheter/forsva…

In Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, we are seeing early drone warfare. I would equate this to where Ukraine and Russia were in 2023. The diffusion of drone technology and tactics will increase, particularly whenever the Russo-Ukraine war ends. I doubt that we are prepared.

Ryan O'Leary @RyanO_ChosenCoy

2 weeks ago

One thing that is becoming more common is “PMC” type and drone companies hiring foreigners who did drones in Ukraine for work. The main problem with that, is that anyone can learn to fly a drone in 14-21 days. Give them 6 weeks and they’ll be hitting targets. What they don’t

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Deterrence is working and Russia has no intention of launching a conventional attack against Estonia in the next 12 months, according to our intelligence chief, who is inclined to extend that assessment. A thread worth reading by @holger_r on his conversation with Kaupo Rosin, head of Estonia’s Foreign Intelligence Service.

Holger Roonemaa @holger_r

2 weeks ago

I recently sat down for a live interview with Kaupo Rosin, chief of the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service. Here are some key takeaways from our conversation on Russian threats, sabotage, and intelligence. 🧵 balticflank.substack.com/p/informationa…

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A lot of good detail in this piece on the extent of China's wartime military and financial backing for Iran, including more than 1,300 shipments of dual-use components for missiles and drones, much of it routed via Mahan Air. "The White House has proven reluctant to more seriously confront Beijing over its support for Iran." wsj.com/politics/china…

Trump says no to Riyadh. Even after an attack in Riyadh airport. Wow. In my view, a terrible betrayal of an ally, that will hav profound implications in the region. The US is simply not to be trusted. I would not want to be part of Embassy Riyadh country team now. Also, comments in this article that former diplomats and military commanders also were against joining the Saudis NOT reflective of my foreign policy circle, many of whom (like me) were deeply involved in Yemen ops for years. And who believe alliances matter, particularly with the Saudis. If not helping them now, then when? “Trump Gets Caught in a Dilemma Over a Saudi Plea for Military Help” nytimes.com/2026/09/20/us/… via @NYTimes

Vielen Dank Jan Techau und ‚Internationale Politik Quarterly‘ für die kritische Rezension: „Wie Gady mehrfach nachdrücklich klarmacht, hat Österreich keine Chance, seinem Schicksal zu entkommen. Nicht mit Appeasement, nicht mit ­Heraushalten, und erst recht nicht aufgrund seiner Neutralität, von der tatsächlich immer noch viele glauben, dass sie Österreich eine entkoppelte Sondersicherheit garantiert.“

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From Hennadii Khirhii, the CEO of Ukr Armo Tech: "In this context, the popular 'drones or artillery' debate is flawed in its very premise. Drones have undoubtedly become one of the defining instruments of modern warfare. Before their widespread use, militaries had never possessed such an extensive body of reconnaissance data combined with the ability to adjust fire immediately and assess the outcomes of military decisions. Drones have also completely transformed the rules governing the precision destruction of individual targets. Yet artillery continues to provide the scale and tempo of fire, particularly when engaging grouped targets and concentration areas simultaneously. Once fired, an artillery shell does not depend on a communications link and cannot be neutralized by electronic warfare in the way a drone can. It is therefore the combination of these capabilities that produces a qualitatively new result. Drones significantly enhance artillery in terms of accuracy and speed. They make it possible to strike command posts, logistics, and supply lines in operational depth much more effectively. Artillery, in turn, converts reconnaissance data into scalable firepower. So, to use a metaphor: unmanned systems are the nervous system, but artillery is still the backbone." pravda.com.ua/columns/2026/0…

Vorgeschobener Beobachter @VorgBeob

2 months ago

Es ist halt die Kombination.

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My reading of the "Can Europe Defend Itself?" debate.

Wildberries does not account for “2% of Russia’s GDP.” I keep seeing this figure repeated, but economically it is not a valid measure of the company’s contribution to GDP. A company contributes to GDP through the value added generated by its activities. On that basis, Wildberries’ direct contribution is likely measured in a few tenths of a percentage point of Russian GDP at most. Wildberries’ GMV, (Gross Merchandise Value) of goods traded through the platform, has been estimated at the equivalent of around 2.85% of Russia’s annual GDP. This comparison is not a measure of the firm’s contribution to GDP, it merely gives an indication of the flow/value of goods, sold, much of whose value added is generated by manufacturers, wholesalers, sellers, logistics providers and other actors. Moreover,a portion of the sales that can no longer be handled by Wildberries will simply migrate to other online platforms or physical retailers as part of redistribution. On top of that, Wildberries has lost around 30% of its warehouse surface, yet the company is still operating. The actual economic loss for Russia as a country is therefore significantly smaller than the few tenths of a percentage point represented by Wildberries’ direct value added. The same goes with damages, in fact, reconstruction itself generates economic activity and therefore contributes positively to measured GDP, despite the underlying destruction representing a real loss of wealth. Let us use real economic indicators and metrics. There is a massive misunderstanding at the moment on what represents a significant economic loss and the order of magnitude of the respective damages inflicted by both sides with long range strikes. A 2% GDP loss this year would be better represented by the current impossibility to export grain by Ukraine. Not by Wildberries. I wrote about this in more detail on Substack: delwinstrategy.substack.com/p/wildberries-…

The global shortage of ballistic missile interceptors — particularly Patriots — and the failure of U.S. manufacturers to dramatically ramp up production has emerged as the Achilles heel of the entire free world and its partners. “There is now a risk of an acute crisis across different theaters brought about by the shortage of interceptors and missile defense,” said John Bew, who served as foreign-policy adviser to British prime ministers in 2019-2024 and is now a professor at the War Studies Department of King’s College London. “This has immediate implications for the Gulf, of course, but is increasingly understood as a major shortfall in European defense and has potentially major consequences in Asia, too.” wsj.com/world/us-weapo…

Yaroslav Trofimov @yarotrof

2 months ago

Allies used to worry whether America would. Now, friends and foes wonder whether America can. My @WSJ essay on how the perception of America’s diminished capability after the inconclusive war on Iran is reshaping the strategic landscape. wsj.com/world/us-weapo…

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"Die Ukraine würde 140 Patriot-Raketen pro Monat benötigen", sagt Oberstleutnant Christoph Göd. #Bundesheer sound.orf.at/radio/oe1/beit…

The US doesn't control the Strait of Hormuz, as Trump has repeatedly claimed. But it is gaining ground, per @DavidGoldmanCNN --> cnn.com/2026/08/18/bus…

Grundwehrdiener leisten einen Dienst für die Gesellschaft: Man muss ihnen danken, weil sie ihre Gesundheit und ihr Leben für den Schutz der eigenen Bevölkerung geben. Diese Bereitschaft als „Zwangsdienst“ abzuwerten, schwächt genau jene Haltung, auf die eine glaubwürdige Landesverteidigung angewiesen ist. #Bundesheer

From Forward Defense to Forward Offense Naqdi’s remarks point to a broader doctrinal shift in what might be described as Islamic Republic 3.0. At its core is a rethinking of Iran’s long-standing doctrine of forward defense. Rather than relying primarily on partners and proxies to keep conflict away from Iranian territory, Tehran appears increasingly prepared to adopt a more assertive model of forward offense, one in which Iran itself initiates military action, accepts greater escalation risks, and employs its own capabilities directly. Iran will increasingly rely on its sovereign military capabilities, including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and UAVs, rather than reserving kinetic action primarily for its proxies. The proxy network will remain an important source of strategic depth and regional influence, but it will increasingly complement rather than substitute for Iranian force. This also suggests a shift from a predominantly reactive posture toward a more proactive one. Tehran may no longer wait for threats to reach Iranian territory. Instead, it will seek to anticipate threats, disrupt them early, and shift the battlefield onto an adversary’s territory. Iran’s operations against Kurdish opposition groups in northern Iraq offer one example of this logic in practice. Perhaps most consequentially, Tehran appears increasingly willing to accept the risks associated with direct interstate confrontation. Iran’s partners and proxies will continue to provide flexibility and geographic reach and depths, but Tehran has demonstrated that it is prepared to employ Iranian military power directly when it believes its deterrence is at stake. This evolution reflects a broader conclusion in Tehran: the era in which Iran could enjoy relative immunity while projecting power through third parties is ending. If Iranian leaders believe that the homeland itself is now an increasingly legitimate target for its adversaries, they may conclude that restraint provides diminishing returns. Future confrontations could therefore involve more frequent and more visible employment of Iranian military power. For yhe US, Israel and the Gulfstates, the central challenge is not simply that Iran may become more aggressive. It is that the assumptions that have underpinned escalation management may no longer hold. For decades, the assumption was that Tehran generally preferred calibrated, deniable, and indirect responses to actions that could trigger a major interstate war. That expectation can no longer be taken for granted. The emerging Iranian approach is therefore likely to be less proxy-dependent, more risk-tolerant, and more willing to employ sovereign military power beyond Iran’s borders. This does not necessarily mean Tehran is abandoning deterrence or rational cost-benefit calculations. It means that the threshold at which Iranian leaders believe direct military action serves those objectives may be falling . Thus, deterring Iran will increasingly require understanding not only what Tehran fears, but when it believes escalation itself has become the safer option. #iran

The Hormuz Letter @HormuzLetter

2 months ago

BREAKING: Iran has shifted from defense to offense, aggressively restructuring its military for an offensive posture abroad and warning to prolong the war until Trump leaves office on January 20, 2029, per Bloomberg. After Mojtaba Khamenei approved an extensive reorganization

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Call it information advantage or decision superiority or dominance. At the end of the day, these are variations on the same idea. These concepts & the doctrine behind them rest on the assumption that effectively mapping an adversary’s system and identifying its key nodes can help paralyze the enemy without having to destroy the force as a whole, thereby reducing the munitions required.