SYNCODA @syncoda

Mid-circuit reset is what surface-code and qLDPC experiments need. For enterprise hybrid pipelines, circuits-per-second is now the operational metric — not the marketing qubit number.

The gain is reset, not qubit count. Independent dissipative reset drops T1 from ~200 µs to ~25 ns on demand, cutting initialization error ~25× while holding Heron-class two-qubit fidelity.

IBM Nighthawk r2 now live: 120 qubits, 100k+ circuits/sec (25× Heron). Dissipative reset: ~1 µs idle + mid-circuit QEC. Accurate PEA at 7,500 gates. Throughput is now a first-class hardware metric. 📍 IBM Quantum Blog
#QuantumComputing #IBMQuantum

The only Quantum secure format preserving encryption. Tested 7/7 ✅✅ github.com/khalilahalwadh…

Solution? Quantum-safe format-preserving encryption (FPE) library — SPN architecture immune to Simon's algorithm. Rust + Python. ASIACRYPT 2021. On GitHub now open source github.com/khalilahalwadh…

80% of cyberattacks on Middle Eastern organisations resulted in confidential data breaches (Positive Technologies, 2025). Hackers targeted credentials (29%), trade secrets (29%), and personal data (20%). The Middle East has the second-highest average breach cost globally at $7.3M per incident.

During the 2026 Middle East conflict, hacktivist groups demonstrated the capability to: - Intercept data in transit between servers using pre-planted backdoors and man-in-the-middle positions. - Exfiltrate data over web services and alternative protocols without triggering detection. - Maintain persistent access to network infrastructure for months before activation. - Deploy keylogging, screen capture, browser credential theft, and email collection at scale. - Stage and exfiltrate data using legitimate cloud services to avoid detection.

The critical exposure point is data in transit during migration. When organisations migrate data between servers — whether cloud-to-cloud, on-premise-to-cloud, or between government systems — the data traverses network paths that are vulnerable to interception.

Syncoda is building the first production implementation and making it open source. take three immediate actions: • Audit. Identify all FF1/FF3-1 tokenised fields in your infrastructure. Quantify the harvest-now, decrypt-later exposure window. • Evaluate. Assess FAST as a quantum-safe replacement. Review the open-source fast-fpe library. Engage your cryptographic review board. • Plan. Begin migration planning before NIST's 2030 quantum deprecation timeline. Early movers will have completed migration before regulatory mandates create market-wide urgency.

Conclusion and Call to Action FAST is the peer-reviewed, quantum-safe alternative. Published at ASIACRYPT 2021 by a team with deep FPE expertise (including comforte AG co-founders), it provides structural immunity to Simon's algorithm through its SPN architecture, explicit quantum security parameters, and zero-AES hot-path performance for batch tokenisation.

Migrating from FF1 to FAST requires a structured, reversible process. Syncoda's migration framework operates in five steps with rollback capability at every stage: Step 1: Cryptographic Inventory. Step 2: Parallel Deployment. Step 3: Batch Re-Tokenisation. Step 4: Referential Integrity Validation. Step 5: FF1 Decommission.

For quantum security, FAST specifies doubled round counts: the classical recommendation of L1 = L2 = 3s rounds (where s depends on block length) is doubled to 6s, targeting 128-bit security against quantum adversaries. The SPN structure provides structural immunity to Simon's algorithm, and the increased rounds provide margin against Grover-accelerated brute-force on the round function.

PCI DSS v4.0 Requirement 12.3.3 mandates that organisations maintain a documented cryptographic vulnerability response capability, including a plan to migrate away from compromised algorithms. However, no PCI guidance currently addresses quantum threats to FPE specifically. Organisations that tokenise sensitive data with FF1 today have no standards-body migration path for quantum readiness!

The harvest-now, decrypt-later (HNDL) threat model is particularly acute for tokenised databases. Tokenised PANs, SSNs, and national IDs are stored for years or decades in production databases, data warehouses, and backup systems. An adversary who captures FPE ciphertext today can reverse it once a CRQC becomes available.

Syncoda's position. Syncoda is building the first production implementation of FAST via the open-source fast-fpe library (Rust core, Python bindings, #Apache-2.0/MIT dual licence), integrated into its quantum-secure enterprise data migration platform for tokenisation during live database migrations.

The solution: FAST. Introduced at ASIACRYPT 2021 by Durak, Horst, Horst, and Vaudenay, FAST (Format-preserving encryption And Secure Tokenization) is an SPN-based FPE construction with explicit quantum-security parameters. Its substitution-permutation architecture is structurally immune to Simon's algorithm — there is no "untouched half" for quantum period-finding to exploit. After one-time key setup, FAST requires zero AES calls in the encryption hot path, delivering batch tokenisation performance orders of magnitude faster than FF1.

The Quantum FPE Crisis - Why Every Deployed Tokenization System Is Vulnerable and How FAST Fixes It -- Simon's algorithm breaks the Feistel architecture underpinning every deployed standard. NIST has already removed FF3-1.... FF1 is next. FAST is the quantum-safe replacement.